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| APPLICATION NO.      | FI         | LING DATE  | FIRST NAMED INVENTOR | ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.                   | CONFIRMATION NO |
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| 09/502,565           | 02/11/2000 |            | Timothy S. Farlow    | 12579-002001                          | 5344            |
| 26161                | 7590       | 03/18/2005 |                      | EXAMINER                              |                 |
| FISH & RICHARDSON PC |            |            |                      | STARKS, WILBERT L                     |                 |
| 225 FRANK            | LIN ST     |            | •                    | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |                 |
| BOSTON, MA 02110     |            |            |                      | ART UNIT                              | PAPER NUMBER    |
|                      |            |            |                      | 2121                                  |                 |

DATE MAILED: 03/18/2005

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

|   |   | Application No.  | Applicant(s)   |  |  |  |  |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Office Action Summary                                     |   | 09/502,565   | FARLOW, TIMOTHY S.   |  |  |  |  |
|   |   | Examiner   | Art Unit   |  |  |  |  |
|   |   | Wilbert L. Starks, Jr.   | 2121   |  |  |  |  |
| Period fo   | The MAILING DATE of this communication app<br>or Reply  | ears on the cover sheet with the c   | orrespondence address  |  |  |  |  |
| THE - Exte<br>after - If the<br>- If NO<br>- Failt<br>Any | ORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. nsions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.13 SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. e period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period were to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing ed patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). | 36(a). In no event, however, may a reply be ting within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) day will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from a cause the application to become ABANDONE | nely filed s will be considered timely. the mailing date of this communication. D (35 U.S.C. § 133). |  |  |  |  |
| Status  | •   | •  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1)⊠   | Responsive to communication(s) filed on 27 De   | ecember 2004.  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2a)⊠  | This action is <b>FINAL</b> . 2b) ☐ This  | action is non-final.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3)□   |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Disposit  | ion of Claims   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5)□<br>6)⊠<br>7)□   | Claim(s) 1,2 and 6-86 is/are pending in the app<br>4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdraw<br>Claim(s) is/are allowed.<br>Claim(s) 1,2 and 6-86 is/are rejected.<br>Claim(s) is/are objected to.<br>Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/or  | vn from consideration.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| Applicat  | ion Papers  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9)[   | The specification is objected to by the Examine   | r.   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10)[  | The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) acce   | epted or b) objected to by the I   | Examiner.  |  |  |  |  |
|   | Applicant may not request that any objection to the   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 11)□  | Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correct The oath or declaration is objected to by the Ex   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Priority (  | under 35 U.S.C. § 119   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| a)  | Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign  All b) Some * c) None of:  Certified copies of the priority documents  Certified copies of the priority documents  Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents  application from the International Bureau  See the attached detailed Office action for a list   | s have been received. s have been received in Applicati ity documents have been receive I (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).  | on No<br>ed in this National Stage   |  |  |  |  |
| Attachmer   | ıt(s)   | _  |  |  |  |  |  |
|   | ce of References Cited (PTO-892)  | 4) Interview Summary Paper No(s)/Mail Da   |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3) 🔲 Infor  | ce of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) mation Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08) or No(s)/Mail Date  |  | Patent Application (PTO-152)   |  |  |  |  |

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#### **DETAILED ACTION**

### Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

1. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

the invention as disclosed in claims 1-86 is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

2. Regardless of whether any of the claims are in the technological arts, none of them is limited to practical applications in the technological arts. Examiner finds that *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) controls the 35 USC §101 issues on that point for reasons made clear by the Federal Circuit in *AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the act of:

...[T]aking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation. *AT&T v. Excel* at 1453 quoting *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Examiner finds that Applicant's "human resources knowledge model" references are just such abstract ideas.

3. Examiner bases his position upon guidance provided by the Federal Circuit in *In* re Warmerdam, as interpreted by AT&T v. Excel. This set of precedents is within the same line of cases as the Alappat-State Street Bank decisions and is in complete

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agreement with those decisions. Warmerdam is consistent with State Street's holding that:

Today we hold that the transformation of data, representing <u>discrete dollar amounts</u>, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result" -- a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades. (emphasis added) State Street Bank at 1601.

- 4. True enough, that case later eliminated the "business method exception" in order to show that business methods were not per se nonstatutory, but the court clearly *did not* go so far as to make business methods *per se statutory*. A plain reading of the excerpt above shows that the Court was *very specific* in its definition of the new *practical application*. It would have been much easier for the court to say that "business methods were per se statutory" than it was to define the practical application in the case as "...the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price..."
- 5. The court was being very specific.
- 6. Additionally, the court was also careful to specify that the "useful, concrete and tangible result" it found was "a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and <u>relied upon</u> by regulatory authorities and in subsequent <u>trades</u>." (i.e. the trading activity is the <u>further practical use</u> of the real world <u>monetary</u> data beyond the transformation in the computer i.e., "post-processing activity".)

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7. Applicant cites no such specific results to define a useful, concrete and tangible result. Neither does Applicant specify the associated practical application with the kind of specificity the Federal Circuit used.

8. Furthermore, in the case *In re Warmerdam*, the Federal Circuit held that:

...[The dispositive issue for assessing compliance with Section 101 in this case is whether the claim is for a process that goes beyond simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'natural phenomena' ... As the Supreme Court has made clear, '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, ... taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation. In re Warmerdam 31 USPQ2d at 1759 (emphasis added).

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- 9. Since the Federal Circuit held in *Warmerdam* that this is the "dispositive issue" when it judged the usefulness, concreteness, and tangibility of the claim limitations in that case, Examiner in the present case views this holding as the dispositive issue for determining whether a claim is "useful, concrete, and tangible" in similar cases.

  Accordingly, the Examiner finds that Applicant manipulated a set of abstract "human resources knowledge models" to solve purely algorithmic problems in the abstract (i.e., what *kind* of "knowledge" is used in the block? Algebraic word problems? Boolean logic problems? Fuzzy logic algorithms? Probabilistic word problems? Philosophical ideas?

  Even vague expressions, about which even reasonable persons could differ as to their meaning? Combinations thereof?) Clearly, a claim for manipulation of "human resources knowledge model" is provably even more abstract (and thereby less limited in practical application) than pure "mathematical algorithms" which the Supreme Court has held are per se nonstatutory in fact, it *includes* the expression of nonstatutory mathematical algorithms.
- 10. Since the claims are not limited to <u>exclude</u> such abstractions, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim limitations <u>includes</u> such abstractions. Therefore, the claims are impermissibly abstract under 35 U.S.C. 101 doctrine.
- 11. Since Warmerdam is within the Alappat-State Street Bank line of cases, it takes the same view of "useful, concrete, and tangible" the Federal Circuit applied in State Street Bank. Therefore, under State Street Bank, this could not be a "useful, concrete and tangible result". There is only manipulation of abstract ideas.

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12. The Federal Circuit validated the use of *Warmerdam* in its more recent *AT&T*Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. decision. The Court reminded us that:

Finally, the decision in In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) is not to the contrary. \*\*\* The court found that the claimed process did nothing more than manipulate basic mathematical constructs and concluded that 'taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation'; hence, the court held that the claims were properly rejected under §101 ... Whether one agrees with the court's conclusion on the facts, the holding of the case is a straightforward application of the basic principle that mere laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not within the categories of inventions or discoveries that may be patented under §101. (emphasis added) AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

- 13. Remember that in *In re Warmerdam*, the Court said that this was the dispositive issue to be considered. In the *AT&T* decision cited above, the Court reaffirms that this is the issue for assessing the "useful, concrete, and tangible" nature of a set of claims under 101 doctrine. Accordingly, Examiner views the *Warmerdam* holding as the dispositive issue in this analogous case.
- 14. The fact that the invention is merely the manipulation of *abstract ideas* is clear. The data referred to by Applicant's phrase "human resources knowledge model" is simply an abstract construct that does not limit the claims to the transformation of real world data (such as monetary data or heart rhythm data) by some disclosed process. Consequently, the necessary conclusion under *AT&T*, *State Street* and *Warmerdam*, is straightforward and clear. The claims take several abstract ideas (i.e., "human resources knowledge models" in the abstract) and manipulate them together adding nothing to the basic equation. Claims 1-86 are, thereby, rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.

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### Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-86 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph because current case law (and accordingly, the MPEP) require such a rejection if a 101 rejection is given because when Applicant has not in fact disclosed the practical application for the invention, as a matter of law there is no way Applicant could have disclosed *how* to practice the *undisclosed* practical application. This is how the MPEP puts it:

("The how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the invention.... If the application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the application also fails as a matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112."); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 942, 153 USPQ 48, 53 (CCPA 1967) ("Necessarily, compliance with § 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inventions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach how to use a useless invention."). See, MPEP 2107.01(IV), quoting In re Kirk (emphasis added).

Therefore, claims 1-86 are rejected on this basis.

# Response to Arguments

15. Applicant's arguments filed 12/27/2004 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically:

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### **Argument 1**

### Applicant argues the following:

Without conceding the examiner's position, the applicant has amended the claims to indicate that the claimed invention is implemented in a computer, and to clarify that the information being processed by the computer implemented system is human resources information. The processing of human resources information is a practical application in the technological arts. The human resources information represented by the claimed data, combined by the compiler in response to queries from a system user, and displayed to the system user to facilitate comparative analysis" is concrete information relied on by the system user to make human resources decisions.

Examiner disagrees. "Human resources information" is still a reference to data that is not concrete. Applicant has not shown how this data is more concrete than opinions, abstract goals, abstract numbers, human thought, or anything else that could fall under the recited field of use "human resources information."

Simply claiming the processing of unnamed data within the field of use "human resources" is insufficient to disclose an actual practical application. Applicant's argument is unpersuasive and the 35 U.S.C. §101 rejections STAND.

#### **Argument 2**

# Applicant argues the following:

The "knowledge block" referred to in the amended claims is not an abstract construct. It is a specific, real-world data structure which represents information in a specific manner. The claims recite transformation of the human resources information encoded in this real world data structure. Whether the information so encoded is in fact abstract is immaterial. The claims recite manipulating the "knowledge block" data structures so that the encoded information may be presented in a manner in which it could not have been otherwise presented. This presentation of information (encoded in the data structure), whatever that information may be, in a new manner is a "useful, concrete, and tangible" result necessary for patentability.

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Examiner asks: "Now, the data block contains knowledge of ...... what???"

Applicant has not specified this. The "knowledge" could be a collection of opinions, abstract goals, abstract numbers, random human thoughts, or anything else that could fall under the recited field of use "human resources information." While Applicant recites the use of some abstract "knowledge block", In re Warmerdam actually recited an even more specific data structure by reciting the use of a "bubble hierarchy"....and even that "bubble hierarchy" data structure was insufficient, in the view of the Federal Circuit, to impart statutory matter to the claim.

Examiner is at a loss as to how a data representation even more abstract than a "bubble hierarchy" (i.e., a "knowledge block"...whether it is a common paragraph, a matrix in linear algebra, a segment of data in a data stream, or whatever...) would be more satisfying to the Federal Circuit's requirements than the particular "bubble hierarchy" that was **rejected** by the Federal Circuit in <u>Warmerdam</u>. Applicant's term "knowledge block" is so abstract, it actually could <u>include</u> representations of "bubble hierarchies" (e.g., to map spheres of influence in a corporation) in block form.

Examiner finds Applicant's arguments to be quite unpersuasive and the 35 U.S.C. §101 rejections STAND.

#### Conclusion

16. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

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A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the Examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr. whose telephone number is (571) 272-3691.

Alternatively, inquiries may be directed to the following:

| S. P. E. Anthony Knight | (571) 272-3687 |
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**WLS** 

15 March 2005